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1. Introduction 
The principle of ultima ratio is acknowledged as an important limitation of States' 
power1 and thus of ius puniendi in every European country but in Germany and its fol-
lowers on the path of civil law doctrine. (Almost) every criminal law scholar talks about 
ultima ratio, but it is still somehow unclear what the concept implies.2 In general, ultima 
ratio means that 
„if interference is necessary, then aid, support, care, insurance and license arrange-
ments should take precedence over coercive measures. If coercive measures are neces-
sary, they need not consist in sanctions. If sanctions are necessary, private law sanctions 
might be preferable to administrative sanctions."3 
ASHWORTH calls it the minimalist approach (he is 'in favour of minimalism'), which 
is based on a particular conception of the relationship of criminal law to other forms of 
social control. As he stated: 
„criminal law is a preventive mechanism, but there are others. Morality, social con-
vention and peer pressure are three informal sources of control, and in many spheres it 
seems preferable to leave the regulation of certain behaviour to those forces. Within the 
law itself there are at least two other major techniques in addition to criminalization: 
there is civil liability, best exemplified by the laws of tort and contract, and administra-
tive regulation, which includes such measures as licensing and franchising."4 
1 NAGY, FERENC: A magyar büntetőjog általános része. Hvg-orac, Budapest, 2010. 59.p. The opinions of the 
Hungarian scholars are analysed in KARSAI, KRISZTINA: Az ultima ratio elvről - másképpen. In: „Sapienti 
sa t . . . " Ünnepi kötet Dr. Cséka Ervin professzor 90. születésnapjára (szerk.: FANTOLY ZSANETT - JUHÁSZ 
ZSUZSANNA-NAGY FERENC). Acta Jur. et Pol. Tomus LXXIV. Szeged, 2012. pp. 253 -260 
2 JAREBORG, NILS: Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio). Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 
2004/2 p. 526. 
3 JAREBORG (2004) p. 524. 
4 ASHWORTH, ANDREW: Principles of Criminal Law. Clarendon Law Series, 1995. p. 33. 
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The ultima ratio principle is frequently said to entail that criminalisation should only 
be used as the „uttermost means in uttermost cases."5 The question, that arises concern-
ing these 'uttermost cases' is: in what comparison are they 'uttermost'? What values 
and interests shall been compared to get the result in being 'uttermost'? Different sub-
stantive values, like in cases of robbery, rape, and forgery? Obviously not. Any and all 
such comparison shall find its footing in the fact of the similarity of values whose in-
fringement shall be compared, and some of these becomes then labelled as 'uttermost'. 
Ultima ratio presupposes that the same social or individual interests shall be protected 
by different fields of law. As a consequence, criminal law is not used as an alternative 
but an additional means applied on the basis of pre-existing provisions of administrative 
or civil law.6 It means that less severe injuries of the same (or comparable) interest shall 
be protected by less severe sanctions introduced by severe regulation, but the most seri-
ous violation of interest is to be punished by the harshest of sanctions. This flows also 
from the general acceptance of the principle of proportionality. 
Therefore, criminal law — as a last resort - is the severest set of legal measures only 
in comparison with other legal interventions countering the infringement of the same or 
at least comparable legal interests. The forgery of luxury brands might be a good exam-
ple for this: the confusing labelling of the product can violate (i) the statutory definition 
of competition infringement or (ii) that of advertisement infringement, (iii) of a regula-
tory offence or (iv) of a criminal offence dependent on the further objective and subjec-
tive circumstances to be taken into consideration. In this case, the similarity of protected 
interests is given; therefore, it is reasonable to talk about ultima ratio, if we would like 
to analyse criminal law implications. 
Without pre-existent extrinsic protections for comparable interests outside of the 
field of criminal law, criminal law cannot serve as the last means but the only one ('sola 
ratio'). If in a legal order there are important values of a society which are protected 
only by criminal law, it is not reasonable to talk about the ultima ratio in connection 
with those. For example personal freedom and sexual freedom (today)7 could typify as 
protected interests (Rechtsgut) in criminal law, but if other fields of law are „activated" 
in connection with these, they might only contain rules on further consequences but not 
on less liability for the forbidden behaviour itself.8 
We shall not mistake these cases for those where the non-criminal laws contain pro-
hibitive provisions but criminal law itself is silent. By this I mean that infringements of 
private or administrative law do not always amount to afore-said 'uttermost' cases. 
Criminal law is therefore rather 'fragmented'9 because the existence of prohibitive pro-
visions in any other branch of law is not (always) sufficient to activate criminal law.10 
Consequently, the texture of every (democratic and proportional) criminal law system is 
mosaic-like. Therefore, if the assault on a protected social value or interest does not es-
5 JAREBORG ( 2 0 0 4 ) p . 5 3 4 . 
6 LAGODNY, OTTO: Strafrecht vor den Schranken der Grundrechte, Mohr Siebeck, 1996. p. 348. 
7 According to Hungarian criminal law. 
8 See more at KARSAI, KRISZTINA: Fogyasztóvédelem és büntetőjog, Hvg-orac, 2011. pp. 37-51. 
9 Fragmentary criminal law is a concept of KARL BINDING (1902) used until today. See ROXIN, CLAUS: 
Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil. 4. Auflage. München, C. H. Beck, 2006. p. 45. 
10 See more FELIX, DAGMAR: Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung. Mohr Siebeck, 1998. p. 297. 
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calate and/or only criminal law is invoked to protect it, ultima ratio is not comprehensi-
ble. The limits of state power are only formulated by proportionality. 
Ultima ratio is rather a tool for comparison of legal answers to infringements. This 
is a correct delimitation without creating a better position for ultima ratio because to be 
able to decide upon the 'uttermost means' it would be necessary to differentiate between 
less severe, severe, more severe or uttermost (etc.) sanctions in the legal order. Ultima 
ratio itself does not have the necessary substantial elements to qualify for this test. Such 
testing can be accomplished in connection with proportionality - therefore, and that is 
what I argue for herein, we shall avoid any general and vague reference to ultima ratio 
when speaking of criminal law, we shall limit ultima ratio to contexts of escalating vio-
lations of the same social value in the legal order. 
For example in the case of rape, criminal law is not the last resort, it is the only one. 
Consequently, if such principle is not generally valid in its scope of application, there is 
no reason to speak about the ultima ratio as a principle in criminal law. Therefore, it can 
only be acknowledged if we examine different chains of escalating violations of the 
same social value or interest. 
In every modern democratic society, the subsidiarity of criminal law is an acknowl-
edged principle, which entails that criminal law and responsibility based on criminal 
law shall apply only if the infringement of the legal interests in question cannot be dealt 
with by way of measures of other - less severe - legal regulations. This concept of se-
verity has two definitive elements: criminal law is both substantively and structurally 
more severe or the most severe in comparison with other branches of law. Substantive 
severity would mean that criminal law is always considered as the most severe branch 
of law due to the abstract possibility of imposing the harshest sanctions (imprisonment) 
and the biggest restrictions on personal freedom against any violation of the law. By dif-
ferentiating this structurally based (system-based) severity from investigating the sub-
stantive element (i.e. sanctions), we need to point out that if we focus on the institu-
tional background and the regulation of the procedures in question, and the power of the 
state in designing and influencing the entire framework and the dynamics of the proce-
dure, we come to the conclusion that the bigger the power of the state in these areas, the 
more rigorous the structure of the system. Today, it is also obvious that the outlines of 
the categorisation of different fields of law based on the severity of sanctions applied 
are rather blurred, the imposition of increased fines by administrative authorities (or an 
obligation set by a civil court resulting in a payment of damages in the settlement of a 
tort claim) is not always considered to be less severe than a sentence of suspended im-
prisonment, to mention one example. 
This principle of subsidiarity is in a strict connection with ultima ratio, which pro-
vides an additional element enabling the enforcement of subsidiarity; this additional 
element - added by the ultima ratio - is the 'uttermost'. If other legal regimes have 
failed for whatever reason in remedying a violation of the law, subsidiarity would allow 
activating criminal law protections, and here, ultima ratio is a 'material and qualifying 
element' meaning that the criminal law shall be activated only in case the most impor-
tant social values sustain the most severe injuries. Consequently, in cases of sola ratio, 
subsidiarity of criminal law cannot be enforced. 
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2. The Ultima Ratio Character of European Criminal Law 
In searching for European aspects of ultima ratio we shall bear in mind the following 
questions: 1) How can - if ever - the ultima ratio principle limit the already unveiled 
splits of ius puniendi of the European legislator? 2) Can ultima ratio be somehow ac-
knowledged by the EU or the ECJ? 3) Is there, and if yes, to what extent, a connection 
between ultima ratio and the European subsidiarity principle? 
According to the argumentation above, ultima ratio as a limiting principle might 
only be used if activating criminal law (on the European level) follows the less severe 
measures in case of less severe infringements for the same value or interest. This would 
mean that the competences laid down in Article 82, 83 and 325 TFEU could be used 
only in cases if EU law contains express prohibitions in protecting certain values, which 
values are simultaneously safeguarded by criminal law as well. Competences to adopt 
procedural or jurisdiction rules do not fall within the scope of ultima ratio and EU 
measures cannot be considered as last resort in comparison to the national level of 
criminal law. The latter context is rather relevant to the discussion on the links between 
subsidiarity and ultima ratio. 
Observing the status quo on the European level, the picture is much more compli-
cated than expected. The competence as set forth in paragraph 1, Article 83 does not 
represent neither the possibility of the most severe legal reaction against 'extreme' vio-
lations of interests protected by other means of European Law nor the presupposed 
chains of escalating violations of same interests. This is well described by JAREBORG, 
who argues that from the definition of ultima ratio it follows logically „that criminaliza-
tion should be used only as [the] uttermost means in [the] uttermost cases" and he also 
asserts that the word 'only' shall be discarded. He argued to „look at what we could do 
with the phrase 'uttermost means in uttermost cases' in a principled way! The ultima ra-
tio principle has always been regarded as a principle against criminalization - as stating 
a necessary condition. If it is instead taken to state a sufficient condition, it will be 
transformed into a principle for criminalization."11 
By analysing ultima ratio on the European level, J A R E B O R G ' s thesis can be reaf-
firmed and applied. Paragraph 1, Article 83 contains measures against particularly seri-
ous crimes „with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such 
offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis." This special need 
could serve as basis for ius puniendi, without being able to limit its use. Moreover, I 
would argue that in terms of these competences, ultima ratio must be understood as de-
fined by JAREBORG, a principle for (i.e. in favour of) criminalization (in a broader 
sense). Limits of such competences are rather flown from proportionality and subsidiar-
ity, as it will be discussed below. 
Prima facie, the same could be expected by analysing the competences set out under 
paragraph 4 Article 325. The Union legislator shall adopt „the necessary measures in 
the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of 
the Union", as it has been already invoked above. The interpretation of „necessity" as 
apparent in this rule could result in similar content as that of the competence provided 
" JAREBORG (2004) p. 534. 
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under paragraph 1 Article 83. Until this competence is first activated by the legislator, 
the academia is forced to navigate through a foggy quagmire of abstract concepts. The 
good news is, however, that the Commission has uttered to take a stand on this issue, in 
connection with the directive's proposal on the protection of financial interests. 
,,[C]riminal investigations and sanctions may have a significant impact on citizens' 
rights and include a stigmatising effect. Therefore, criminal law must always remain a 
measure of last resort ('ultima ratio'). This is reflected in the general principle of pro-
portionality (as embodied in the Treaty on European Union and, specifically for crimi-
nal penalties, in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). For criminal law measures 
supporting the enforcement of EU policies, the Treaty explicitly requires a test of 
whether criminal law measures are 'essential' to achieve the goal of an effective policy 
implementation. Therefore, the legislator needs to analyse whether measures other than 
criminal law measures, e.g. sanction regimes of administrative or civil nature, could not 
sufficiently ensure the policy implementation and whether criminal law could address 
the problems more effectively. This will require a thorough analysis in the Impact As-
sessments preceding any legislative proposal, including for instance and depending on 
the specificities of the policy area concerned, an assessment of whether Member States' 
sanction regimes achieve the desired result and difficulties faced by national authorities 
implementing EU law on the ground."12 
It is important to see that if the European legislator interprets the Article as de-
scribed above then the restricted ultima ratio principle elaborated in this study might be 
of significance. 
Finally, paragraph 2 Article 83 can be applied for any measure „which proves essen-
tial to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been 
subject to harmonisation measures". In my view, this provision does refer to other regu-
latory regimes of European Law, to fields outside of criminal law, and the aim of this 
competence (created through Article 83) is to establish a gapless legal texture against 
violation of legal domains „which [have] been subject to harmonisation measures". Si-
multaneously, this means that the regulatory regimes ('harmonised areas') have the 
same subjects in terms of protected values and interests as those of the envisaged crimi-
nal law measures. 
In searching for further invocations of the ultima ratio principle, we can find further 
inferences among the justifications provided for political documents. In connection with 
the EU drug strategy, it has been stated that it is constructed around „law enforcement 
12 Communication from the Commission: Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implemen-
tation of EU policies through criminal law COM (2011) 573 final, 20.9.2011, Nr 2.2; and also Commission 
Staff Working Paper; Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of the financial interests of the European Union by criminal law SWD 
(2012) 195 final, 11.7.2012, Annex II, 2. 
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measures, which should only be used as a last resort (ultima ratio)."n Another instance 
that made reference to ultima ratio stated that: 
„Given the punitive and controversial nature of criminal sanctions, the criminalisa-
tion of States by the Union for a particular form of conduct should be a last resort ('ul-
tima ratio'). The difficulties faced by Member States in the implementation of an EU 
policy, compromising the effectiveness of that policy, should not in themselves be suf-
ficient to justify recourse to criminal law. The conduct in question must also constitute a 
serious violation of an interest which is considered to be fundamental.14 
3. Awareness of Ultima Ratio on the EU Level 
Ultima ratio seems to be a broader concept on the level of EU law than on the level of 
the MS; it is not only used in the context of criminal law due to the structural considera-
tions the EU is built around. A basic and fundamental concept of ultima ratio is con-
nected to the basic philosophy of any legal order, through which legal norms are con-
strued to be the last resorts in regulation; the law itself is the ultima ratio. 
„In the field of rules or 'what should be', what characterises 'legal' provisions, as 
opposed to moral or aesthetic rules, is forcibility; the possibility that compliance can be 
demanded by the courts and that a breach can be sanctioned. One typical feature of the 
'ius cogens' or 'compelling law' is the possibility of 'enforcement', in principle by 
means of a judicial mechanism, to ensure that the law is applied, or, in the event it is 
not, that those in breach are penalised. At the very heart of 'what should be', however, 
is the concept that compliance with laws is, generally speaking, voluntary and that re-
course to legal proceedings is the exception — the 'ultima ratio'. Without the voluntary 
and widespread agreement of the public to comply with the duties imposed by the rules, 
their effectiveness would be irremediably compromised. Hence the legislator's respon-
sibility to lay down laws that by and large encourage people to observe them voluntarily 
and to comply with them spontaneously. These responses are, in fact, prerequisites for 
everyone's rights to be respected and are a cornerstone of living as part of society. 
Against this backdrop, the concern for 'good law-making' and 'better law-making' 
takes on particular significance and has major implications for the interpretation, inte-
gration and application of laws."15 
13 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the "Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council — Towards a stronger European response to drugs" COM(2011) 
689 final, OJ C 229, 7.31.2012, pp. 85-89. 
14 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the "Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions — Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies 
through criminal law" CC)M(2011) 573 final, OJ C 191, 29.6.2012, 97-102 Nr 1.4. 
15 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The proactive law approach: a further step 
towards better regulation at EU level OJ C 175, 28.7.2009, 26-33 Nr 3. 
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Ultima ratio is more tangible in cases where sectorial regulatory frameworks might 
be affected. Relevant to the present financial crisis, the common European crisis man-
agement framework could be the ultima ratio in comparison with 'normal' functional 
frameworks of the financial market. 
„To the extent that the risk of sovereign debt crises still remains relevant even under 
such strengthened fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance, and with the purpose of safe-
guarding the stability of the euro area as a whole, it is desirable to establish a permanent 
crisis management framework which can, as ultima ratio, provide temporary financial 
support to Member States whose currency is the euro experiencing impaired access to 
market financing. Such framework should be designed in a way that minimises moral 
hazard and reinforces incentives for pre-emptive fiscal and macroeconomic adjust-
ment."16 
Another emblematic example can be, when the European norm shall serve as the ul-
tima ratio in connection with national regulatory systems: 
„[Ojption 6 is best suited to achieve objective 3. It would ensure safety of cosmetic 
products without negative impact on innovation and on new developments as it would 
permit turning to the detailed regulation of individual ingredients only as ultima ra-
fio."17 
A delicate connection was implied by avocat général Mischo in relation to strict na-
tional housing rules for migrant workers (requiring that the family live under normal 
housing circumstances). He argued that „the provisions in issue in reality constitute 
merely an ultima ratio, a sort of 'sword of Damocles' intended to encourage migrant 
workers to comply with the rule."18 
Ultima ratio demonstrates an ability to adapt to the environment and context of in-
terpretation on the EU level. Under ex-Article 224 TEC19 it is invoked for the protection 
of certain crucial interests of the Member States, construed as a safety valve for the MS, 
hence an exception from the obligations normally incumbent upon Member States under 
Community law. 
16 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 March 2011 on a draft European Council Decision amending 
Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism 
for Member States whose currency is the euro (CON/2011/24) O J C 140, 11.05.2011,8-11 N r 2 . 
17 Commission staff working paper: Impact assessment. Report on simplification of the "Cosmetics Direc-
tive" SEC (2008) 117 final, 5.2.2008, Nr 6. 
18 Opinion of Mr avocat general MlSCHO delivered on 17 January 1989. Case 249/86 Commission of the 
European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany [ECR] 1989 1263 Nr 6. 
19 Article 224 TEC: Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to 
prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by measures which a Member State may be 
called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbance affecting the maintenance of law and order, 
in the event of war or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obli-
gations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security. 
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„This latter consideration has led the Court (...) to regard Article 224 as ancillary 
vis-à-vis other Treaty provisions, constituting the ultima ratio to which recourse may be 
had only in the absence of any Community provision enabling the demands of public 
order in question to be met. That, indeed, is the main reason why this provision of pri-
mary Community law has never so far been applied.20 
Lastly, a procedural aspect is highlighted as infringement proceedings against a MS 
could be labelled as means of last resort. 
„The Commission endeavours to make the fullest use of the pre-litigation stage of 
the infringement proceedings to persuade the offending Member State to remedy its de-
ficiency or to negotiate a settlement. As the Court has held, referral of an action to it is 
the last resort, 'the ultima ratio' enabling the Community interests enshrined in the 
Treaty to prevail over the inertia and resistance of the Member States"21 
If jurisdictions conflict in criminal matters and the dispute is set to be resolved ami-
cably through mediation, it has been declared that: 
„in any case, the main objective should be to achieve consensual solutions, so that 
the possibility of a binding decision should be considered an ultima ratio where the me-
diation process has failed."22 
As demonstrated, the use of 'ultima ratio' as a reference base is often apparent in the 
arguments of EU institutions; however, without a significant common ground. European 
Law uses the notion in a restrictive sense, of more restrictive procedure and of more re-
strictive rules - this is the only common aspect, i.e. the threat to introduce more rigor-
ous sanctions in case of omission or undesirable action on the part of the MS. Whatever 
this really means. 
In my view, is the EU concept of ultima ratio is not - yet - sufficiently definite for it 
to be invoked as a justified last resort; it is very decorative but severely lacks the „sex 
appeal" of well-solidified legal grounds. 
4. Ultima Ratio and Subsidiarity in the EU 
European integration is characterised at is core by the general principle of subsidiarity, 
which - after several initiatives23 in the early years - was first mentioned in an explicit 
manner in December 1992 when the Edinburgh European Council issued a declaration 
on the principle of subsidiarity, laying down the rules for its application. The Treaty of 
20 Opinion of Mr avocat general COSMAS delivered on 23 March 2000, C^»23/98 Alfredo Albore [ECR] 2000 
1-5965. 
21 Thirteenth annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law COM(1996) 600 final, OJ C 
303, 14.10.1996Nr I.D. 
22 Commission staff working document: Annex to the Green Paper on conflicts of jurisdiction and the princi-
ple of nebis in idem in criminal proceedings (COM(2005) 696 final} SEC (2005) 1767, 23.12.2005, Nr 4. 
23 European Union. Report by Mr. LEO TINDEMANS, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council. 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76. (commonly called the Tindemans Report). 
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Amsterdam continued to set in stone further details in its Protocol on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: 
,,[T]he principle of subsidiarity provides a guide as to how those powers are to be 
exercised at the Community level. Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be ap-
plied in the light of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It allows Community action 
within the limits of its powers to be expanded where circumstances so require, and con-
versely, to be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justified." 
The Treaty of Lisbon is also complemented by a similar Protocol (Nr 2) which 
elaborates on the content of Article 5 TEU and provides important procedural aspects 
for the 'institutional' testing of subsidiarity (and proportionality). 
Article 5 TEU: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. The institutions of the Union shall 
apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments shall ensure compli-
ance with that principle in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol. 
Subsidiarity concerns all draft legislative acts and allows national parliaments to ob-
ject to a proposal on the grounds that it breaches the principle, as a result of which the 
proposal may be maintained, amended or withdrawn by the Commission, or blocked by 
the European Parliament or the Council. In the case of breach of subsidiarity, the Com-
mittee of Regions may also refer directly to the CJEU.24 Subsidiarity also plays an im-
portant role in establishing boundaries for the broad interpretation of EU competences 
in general. 
The Union can act, if the action forms part of the competences conferred upon the 
Union by the Treaties (shared competences in the field of AFSJ). The principle of con-
ferral is fulfilled due to the express competences set forth in TFEU. In the context of 
shared competences, EU-level action is justified if it is most relevant in order to meet 
the objectives set by the Treaties (principle of subsidiarity). The last requirement is for 
the Union to apply its law if the content and form of the action does not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives set by the Treaties (principle of proportionality). 
With regard to criminal law competences defined in TFEU, it is necessary to deline-
ate subsidiarity by defining its core content. 
The first question is whether a conceptual link between subsidiarity of the domestic 
criminal law and that of the European level could be established. It is important to stress 
that only the first element of subsidiarity under Article 5 TEU demonstrates connections 
with subsidiarity (as construed in MS) based on the common content of these two. The 
principle of subsidiarity in criminal law ('criminal law and responsibility based on 
24 See DE NORIEGA, ANTONIO ESTELLA: The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique. Oxford University 
Press, 2002 and DOUGLAS-SCOTT, SLONAIDH: Constitutional Law of the European Union. Pearson Educati-
on, 2002. pp. 173-186.for more details. 
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criminal law shall apply only if the infringement of legal interests in question cannot be 
dealt with by way of measures of other - theoretically less severe - legal regulations') 
includes a true comparison in terms of the possibilities of using different legal regula-
tions enacted by the national legislator. It can decide what legal protections shall be ac-
tivated for different social phenomena, subsidiarity allows for the use of more severe 
sanctions if others are not efficient to deal with the problematic violation at issue. Ul-
tima ratio provides criminal law with proper tools for the 'uttermost' cases. 
Although the principle of subsidiarity itself (in European terms) attributes a special 
character to any European legal regulation compared to domestic legal regimes, this 
does not necessarily mean that the EU regulation would be of substantive severity. 
However, it could be seen as a modality of system-based severity; but not in the field of 
ECL. This means that the domestic principle of subsidiarity with regard to criminal law 
does not have a conceptual link with the European interpretation of subsidiarity. There-
fore, the former shall be understood as was „traditionally", as if it had not been changed 
by the flow of European integration. 
In the following, we shall analyse the meaning of the European principle of subsidi-
arity if the criminal law competences (particularly that of the split ius puniendi) of the 
TFEU are exercised. Article 5 TEU requires the failure of a national legal order as the 
precondition of subsidiarity to be activated and thus the possibility of European legisla-
tion: „only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at 
central level or at regional and local level". This precondition has to be understood as if 
there was a need for ECL action because national measures under the failed domestic 
criminal law framework. Several exceptions can however be detected if similar viola-
tions or endangerments of protected values are categorised differently by the MS (i.e. 
protected not by the umbrella of criminal law but by the law of regulatory offences or 
through further deterrent regimes in administrative law25). These exceptions are consid-
ered to be „labelling issues"; hence, they are not substantial in nature. 
It shall be also noted that in the probable case where an MS does not invoke neither 
criminal law nor any other protection for combating the violation at issue, targeted to be 
regulated by European Criminal Law (ECL) in the future, the MS will have justifica-
tion for obstructing the Union's legislation. There is no doubt that in terms of serious 
forms of organised crime (NB: jurisdiction of AFSJ and ECL to combat these through 
joint effort) the probability of absent criminal law reaction in any MS cannot be ex-
cluded. In terms of competences for the realization of EU policies or to combat fraud, 
the existence of very differing domestic legislations is real. It is noteworthy hereby that 
there are several research projects directed to mapping these dissimilarities between MS 
and to offer adequate solutions to remedy the detrimental effect of this situation.26 
On the European level, subsidiarity - if activated - might not amount to actual rig-
orous reactions, and in this respect, it cannot be compared to the national level (in terms 
of the activation of subsidiarity in the domestic sense). European legislation is just 'an-
25 E.g. the combat against irregular migration or several traffic offences etc. 
26 Tender JUST/2011/JPEN/PR/1012/B3 - „Study on criminal sanction legislation and practice in representa-
tive Member States" 2012-2013; 19.1.2012 JUST/A4/mps - (2012) 61209. 
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other one' with different rules and regimes, but cannot be compared to domestic princi-
ples, not even in the field of criminal law. Therefore, if the precondition for the (first 
element of) European subsidiarity is fulfilled and national (criminal) law has failed, then 
the activation of ECL does neither presuppose nor require 'more severe' EU regimes -
in substantial terms - than the national ones. The subsidiarity rule only allows for the 
establishment of another regulatory regime. However, the competences in the field of 
ECL (and those of the split ius puniendi) does not exclude the enactment of European 
legislation equipped with more severe content in terms of the substantial severity of 
criminal legal regulations. Obviously, this also means that these competences can be 
also used to define offences (and punishments, cf. 'power to define') when criminal law 
regulation first appears on the European level, but also for others - in case of escalating 
violations of the same social value within the domestic legal order. In this case, the Un-
ion will act in protection of the same (or comparable) values in lieu of the (failed) do-
mestic regulation. 
There is no need to further analyse the second element of European subsidiarity, at 
this point, I would only like to point out the several peculiarities in the wording: the Ar-
ticle uses the expression 'better achievement' of the proposed objectives instead of 
'achievement' (in general). Semantically, 'better achievement' is significantly different 
from a mere statement of 'achievement' and is not in contradiction with the following 
wording 'cannot be sufficiently achieved'. It could be also interpreted in a way that the 
new law will achieve the objectives and it will be better. I do not argue for the assump-
tion that the Article differs 'intentionally' in this regard, therefore this second element 
shall be understood as stating the expectation that the C/UL norm be able to achieve the 
goals specified under C/UL. 
5. Summary 
As evidenced above, the ultima ratio principle cannot be used as a general legal basis 
for ECL legislation, albeit there are competences (cf. paragraph 2, Article 83 and para-
graph 4, Article 325), where the restricted interpretation of the ultima ratio principle (as 
shown) can play a role in opening doors for ECL legislation. 
Ultima ratio is used as an effective argument by the institutions of the Union; how-
ever, with criminal law being the focal point of present research, it is obvious that the 
principles of subsidiarity and ultima ratio often appear in an interchangeable manner in 
EU documents. The MANIFESTO assumes a clear position by mentioning both principles 
and stating that: 
,,[T]he European legislator may only demand that an act be criminalised if it is nec-
essary in order to protect a fundamental interest, and if all other measures have proved 
insufficient to safeguard that interest. Only if this condition has been satisfied can 
criminal law be regarded as 'necessary' and in conformance with the European principle 
of proportionality." 
Generally, the substantial content of the subsidiarity principle in criminal law cannot 
be linked to the European subsidiarity, merely the wording is similar. 
